

Una Voce New York

✠ Saint Gregory VII, Patron ✠

BULLETIN

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Some Tridentine Masses in Our Area St. Agnes's Church

Every Sunday at 9:00 a.m.

E. 43rd St. bet. Third and Lexington aves.,
Manhattan
212-682-5722

Holy Innocents Church

Every Sunday at 10:30 a.m.;

Monday - Friday at 6:00 p.m.;

every Saturday at 1:00 p.m.

128 West 37th St., bet. Broadway and Seventh Ave.,
Manhattan
212-279-5861

Shrine of Our Lady of Mount Carmel

*Every Sunday at 10:30 a.m., Monday - Saturday at
7:45 a.m.*

448 E. 116th St., Manhattan
212-534-0681

BULLETIN BOARD

Latin Mass Every Sunday in Queens

There is good news from the Diocese of Brooklyn. Beginning Sunday, October 7, 2018, the traditional Latin Mass will be offered every Sunday morning at the Church of Saint Josaphat, 34-32 210th Street, Bayside, Queens (718-229-1663), at a time to be announced. The regular Sunday traditional Mass that has been offered for many years in the chapel of Saint John's Cemetery in Middle Village, Queens, will be discontinued, as the chapel will unfortunately be pulled down

owing to mold and structural problems. Rev. Fr. Stephen Saffron has been appointed the new Pastor of Saint Josaphat's. As many of you know, Fr. Saffron is a longtime celebrant of the traditional Latin Mass. He hopes eventually to schedule the Mass daily. *Deo gratias!*

MASS FACING THE PEOPLE

The following is the third and final installment of Chapter XIX of Pope Paul's New Mass, the third volume of the late Michael Davies's masterpiece, Liturgical Revolution. In this chapter, Davies shows the sad results of turning the altars round after the Second Vatican Council and explodes the Modernist myth that Mass in ancient times was said facing the people. In his writings, Davies lives on as the foremost defender of the traditional Latin Rite in the English-speaking world.

Trestyl trist

“So, mass, priest, and altar are replaced by Lord's Supper, minister and Holy Table, and the westward replaces the eastward position of the celebrant.” —*Douglas Harrison, Anglican Dean of Bristol*

It is convenient to examine the question of the introduction of table-like altars apart from that of the orientation of the altar. Theoretically, a table could be

used for a celebration in which priest and people faced east together. However, in practice Mass *versus populum* and the *tristyl trist*, miserable table, are part of the same phenomenon, the Protestantization of the Catholic liturgy. It is a carbon copy of what took place at the Reformation. At this point, the reader should refer to *Cranmer's Godly Order*, pp. 95-98, where the replacement of altars by tables is described in detail, together with the significance placed on this step by the Reformers themselves. This is best summarized by Cranmer's explanation:

First, the form of a table shall more move the simple from the superstitious opinions of the Popish Mass unto the right use of the Lord's Supper. For the use of an altar is to make sacrifice upon it: the use of a table is to serve men to eat upon.

In making this statement Cranmer is doing no more than voice the common opinion of all the Reformers. Thus the abandonment of the eastward position and the adoption of a table in place of an altar signified the rejection of sacrifice and, therefore, were invested with an anti-Catholic signification. Hence the use of a table can never be acceptable in Catholic worship. The practice of Mass facing the people had been popularized in Europe by some proponents of the Liturgical Movement well before Vatican II although, as has been explained, this did not necessarily indicate a Protestant outlook but simply a desire that the instructional readings could be read directly to the congregation. However, some discerning Catholic-minded Anglicans expressed serious reservations when High Church and Anglo-Catholic clergy began aping this practice. Hugh Ross Williamson had been a convert to

Anglicanism from Nonconformity and while an Anglican he rejected the practice as incompatible with Catholic belief:

From my childhood, I had been accustomed to the Nonconformist Communion Service and had watched my Father sitting behind the Holy Table, with the chapel deacons on both sides of him, facing the congregation and reading the narrative of the Last Supper before the memorial bread and wine were handed round to the congregation. At Romsey, at Trowbridge, and at Hove this had been a regular monthly ritual and from the time I began to think seriously, it struck me as improper. It was as if they were on a little stage, acting the Supper to us; and one of the reliefs of going to Mass was that the priest was on the same side of the altar as the congregation and that God was our common host. Moreover, as a practical point, one was not distracted by watching the faces of the deacons and banishing from one's mind the intrusive thought of how unlike they were to the Apostles.

The Nonconformist, which is the true Protestant arrangement, had, moreover, a definite doctrinal significance. It was the liturgical witness to the belief that Holy Communion was nothing more than a family meal around a table and not a mystical sacrifice in which the priest, by the miracle of transubstantiation, offered on behalf of the congregation the true Body and Blood of Christ to God before distributing the 'food of immortality' to the worshippers.

The bitter seventeenth-century struggle between Archbishop Laud and

the Puritans centered here. What is often represented as Laud's attempt to restore "dignity and decency" to Church services* was, in fact, his determination to make the "Holy Table" into an "Altar." And this had to do with doctrine, not with dignity.

Mr. Ross Williamson noted that Anglo-Catholic clerics who wished to justify their adoption of the *versus populum* position claimed that they "were trying to keep abreast of the latest developments of continental Catholicism and that the Catholic Church in England would in due time probably follow our lead." Unhappily, the final prediction has proved to be only too accurate.

At this point some consideration must be given to objections which will be raised by those wishing to defend the Protestantization of our liturgy. They would correctly point out that the early Christians referred to the "table of the Lord." This is because the word "altar" was avoided in the early centuries as a result of its pagan connotations. As early as the fifth century the word altar (*altare*) was in use as well as the word table (*mensa*).[†] "Altar" then came into exclusive use except when referring to its function as the table which the faithful approached for the sacred banquet (*sacrum convivium*). The Christian altar could be most accurately described as an altar-table. In the Jewish Pasch the lambs were sacrificed on the altar in the temple and then taken to the homes of the worshippers for the paschal banquet—altar and table were separated. In the Christian Pasch, Christ's sacrifice is made present on the altar, which then serves as the table which the faithful approach with fear and trembling to receive the Body of Christ. There is, thus, no valid comparison between the manner in which the early Christians used the word "table"

and the manner in which it was used by Cranmer—to show publicly that it was not intended to offer a sacrifice. What was acceptable before the Reformation was not acceptable after it because, as Hugh Ross Williamson has explained, the use of a table had become a positive public symbol that what was being celebrated was a Protestant Lord's Supper and not the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Pope Pius XII taught categorically that: "It would be wrong to want the altar restored to its ancient form of a table."

A second argument Liberals will use is that the early Christians actually used a wooden table for the Eucharist. No one disputes this. It must be remembered that, until they were actually allowed to build churches in the fourth century, the early Christians worshipped in their homes (house-churches) or, less frequently, in the catacombs. It would be unrealistic to take what was done in time of persecution as the norm in time of freedom. It must also be remembered that liturgy, like dogma, is not static. Just as the doctrine of the Trinity was understood and defined more clearly as the centuries passed, so the liturgy gradually came to show ever more clearly in its outward signs that it was a solemn sacrifice. When Christians were first allowed to build churches they did so with the altars directly over the tombs of the martyrs. This custom must have been derived directly from the practice of offering Mass on the marble slabs that covered the graves of the martyrs in the catacombs and explains why, as the Church spread, the practice grew up of incorporating the relics of two martyrs into the altar-stone. Marble slabs were incorporated into altars as early as the fifth century although some wooden altars were still in use in the Latin Church as late as the eighth century. From the

ninth century onwards, the use of stone altars in the Latin Church was virtually universal. The Orthodox Church permits the use of wood, stone, or metal in building altars.

It is true that many, if not most, Catholic churches now have permanent stone tables, though some still use wooden ones, but this does not make the innovation any more acceptable. Cranmer said that the use of a *table* was to serve men to eat upon, he did not specify that it was to be a wooden table. Nor did Pope Pius XII condemn only wooden tables—he said that it would be wrong to want “the altar restored to its ancient form of a table.” Thus even the permanent stone tables which now disfigure so many Catholic churches come under the condemnation of Pope Pius XII.

It is by no means suggested that every Catholic priest who has replaced his altar with a table has adopted Cranmer’s Eucharistic theology. Most of them have probably done so simply because all their colleagues were doing so and it seemed the Vatican-Twoish thing to do. Others were ordered to install a table by their bishops. There is certainly a feeling of safety in numbers and it is priests who have refused to smash beautiful altars to build which, sometimes, they personally collected the pennies of their poor parishioners, who appear eccentric and opposed to “progress.” Whatever the beliefs and motives of these priests, it does not alter the fact that they have acquiesced in another step in the Protestantization of our liturgy, a step which Protestants will certainly welcome as such.

*I. e., by restoring the “Holy Table” to its pre-Reformation position against the east wall.

†A Catholic altar should be made of natural stone. It consists of a top slab (*mensa*), the

supports (*stipites*), and the altar cavity for relics (*sepulchrum*), in which the altar stone containing these relics is placed.

—*Michael Davies*

IOTA UNUM

CHAPTER XVII MOBILISM

We are pleased to present another excerpt from one of the most impressive critiques of the Conciliar Church yet penned, Iota Unum, an encyclopaedic study written by Romano Amerio that reveals the breathtaking dimensions of the destruction wrought by the Second Vatican Council and those who have implemented it these fifty unhappy years. We here present the first section of Chapter XVII, “Mobilism,” with the kind permission of Sarto House. Iota Unum is available from The Angelus Press at 2915 Forest Avenue, Kansas City, MO 64109, or at their toll-free number, 800-966-7337, or their website at www.angeluspress.org.

157. Mobilism in modern philosophy.

Mobilism is to metaphysics what Pyrrhonism [the denial of reason —*Ed.*], with its attendant discussionism [manifested in the modern obsession with “dialogue” —*Ed.*], is to logic. It precedes Pyrrhonism, because doubt about the primacy of being is what causes doubt about the primacy of knowledge. Mobilism is a characteristic of the post-conciliar Church, in which as Cardinal Alfrink says, everything has been put in motion and no part of the Catholic system is free from change: *nihil quietum in causa* [“Nothing in the matter is at peace.”].

International organizations take mobilism as being axiomatic. The UNESCO report for 1972 is called *Apprendre à être* [“Learning to be”], but “to

be” is taken as synonymous with “to become” or “to develop.” It is said that “the mind should not stop still in definite conclusions” but should “become extremely ready to change.” It is consequently asserted that there is “a need to educate thought in such a way that it is ready to hypothesize a multiplicity of solutions” of divergent rather than convergent sorts, and a need to prevent the mind adhering to any definitive opinions [*Osservatore Romano*, 10 January 1973]. Truth, that is, stability, is not the law of thought; but rather opinion, that is, what fluctuates continually. UNESCO fails to see that of course someone will be directing the movement of opinion that governs opinion, and that the way is thus open to Hobbes’ Leviathan.

Gaudium et Spes describes mobilism as a characteristic of modern civilization: *Ita genus humanum a notione magis statica ordinis rerum ad notionem magis dynamicam atque evolutivam transit* [“Thus the human race is moving over from a static to a dynamic and evolutionary idea of the order of things.” *Gaudium et Spes*, 5]. The document later refers to modern man’s assertion of human rights and says that this dynamism is positive and in harmony with the Gospel: *Ecclesia ergo iura hominum proclamat et hodierni temporis dynamismum haec iura undique promoventem, agnoscit et magni aestimat* [“The Church therefore proclaims the rights of men, and recognizes and values the dynamism of the present day that promotes these rights everywhere.” *Gaudium et Spes*, 42]. This second statement is specifically concerned with social movements, but the first embraces the whole of human life and seems to make the moral order subject to the law of mobility, when religion holds it to be immobile and a participant in the

divine changelessness. However, if the word dynamism is taken as equivalent to perfecting, the council’s thought remains within the bounds of the traditional understanding, which says that all things are perfectionable, and to be perfected, within an order demanding perfection, but which does not perfect itself.

158. Critique of mobilism. Ugo Foscolo. Kolbenheyer.

As seen in the history of philosophy, mobilism is the mentality that values becoming more than being, motion more than rest, action more than the goal. It is typical of modern thought. Heraclitus of Ephesus, in the sixth century before Christ, taught that reality was flux, but that the flux was ruled by an inviolable law which is the Logos. The whole of Christian philosophy has considered becoming as an accidental quality of all finite substances, and that God alone is unchanging. Italian Romanticism, inasmuch as it imitated the German sort, also believed that change is synonymous with life and that therefore the importance of the mind lies in searching for truth, rather than in possessing it. Foscolo, for example, maintains in his *Dell’origine e dell’ufficio della letteratura* that life consists in the agitation of one’s feelings, and in the continual change of the thoughts of a spirit aspiring towards a vision of the whole truth. He maintains however that to be forever aspiring is better than attaining: “Unhappy man, were he ever to see it! Perhaps he would have no further reason to live.” Goethe’s *Faust* is the poem of a man who dreams of satisfying himself by an infinity of successive experiences; he desires, and as soon as he attains his desire, desires again and never reposes in any attained good.

This restlessness was splendidly expressed this century in Guy Kolbenheyer's great trilogy *Paracelsus* [Berlin, 1935]: the profound meaning of reality lies in becoming, in the endless change of nascent and dying forms projected by a deceiving hope that never rests in the good it attains. The primacy of becoming brings with it the primacy of action and the unimportance of the end pursued: it is the conquering not the conquest, the coming not the arriving, that matters. The most complete theoretical systematization of mobilism is Hegel's philosophy: existing being is an infinitely changing process of becoming across time; becoming infects God and takes away his attributes of absolute changelessness and timelessness.

159. Mobilism in the Church.

Within the Church too, the idea has caught on that changeability is a positive quality and should be accepted; it has replaced the ideas of stability and immutability. The religious injunction remains clear nonetheless: *Stabiles estote et immobiles* [I Corinthians, 15:58. "Be firm and stand fast."]. The Bishop of Metz says: *La mutation de civilisation que nous vivons entraîne des changements non seulement dans notre comportement extérieur, mais dans la conception que nous nous faisons tant de la création que du salut apporté par Jésus-Christ* ["The change of civilization we are living through brings with it changes not only to our external behavior, but to the ideas we have both of creation and of the salvation brought by Jesus Christ." Metz Diocesan Bulletin, 10 October 1967]. At the microphone of France-Inter the same bishop declared: *La théologie antéconciliaire, celle de Trente, est*

désormais terminée [Broadcast on 18 August 1976. "Pre-conciliar theology, the theology of Trent, is henceforth at an end"]. Speaking at odds with his strenuous assertions that the Church is unchangeable, even Paul VI himself said that "the Church has entered the movement of a history that evolves and changes" [*L'Osservatore Romano*, 29 September 1971].

It has become a commonplace in the mentality of this age, learned, half-learned and unlearned, that what matters about an act is not its result, but the act itself, irrespective of the end it has in view, worthy or unworthy: what matters is action itself, not the value it pursues or attains. It need hardly be said that this action for action's sake is the very soul of the great modern political perversions such as Nazism, as Max Picard has shown in a famous book, that can never be famous enough [M. Picard, *Hitler in uns selbst (Hitler in Ourselves)*, Erlenbach-Zürich 1946].

Mgr Illich said when interviewed in his seminary at Cuernavaca [Mexico]: "I believe the Church's function is to participate consciously in all forms of change, in any kind of change. That is the task Christ has given us. We want a Church whose principal function is the celebration of change" [*Dauphiné Libéré*, 26 February 1968]. The style is extravagant, but the spirit it expresses is exactly the one that *agitat molem* ["stirs the whole mass"]. The President of the Italian Theological Association taught at a national convention that "the task of evangelization is to put any stabilization and absolutization into crisis" [*L'Osservatore Romano*, 11 September 1981].

160. Mobilism and the fleeting world. St. Augustine.

As a philosophy of pure becoming, mobilism has a profound significance, acutely perceived by Rosmini in his essay on the philosophy of Ugo Foscolo, and which Rosmini appropriately calls the philosophy of false hope. Mobilism involves the denial of the Infinite as the fullness of being and posits the notion of life as the antithesis of God. In her novel *We the Living*, Ayn Rand makes life itself the supreme good, and God is conceived of as the antithesis of life. To know whether the people she is speaking to believe in life, as she does, the heroine asks them whether they believe in God: “If they answer that they believe in God, I know they don’t believe in life.”

Mobilism is partly true and partly false. The true part is its description of finite existence as becoming, fleetingness, transition, unfulfilledness, quest. *This fleeting world* is well known in religion and in Christian asceticism. The false part is its assertion that the changing reality of finite being is not directed towards an Infinite that does not change and that does satisfy; the assertion that for man there is only an infinite becoming from which he can never reach a perfect and unchanging infinitude. The fleeting world, as religion presents it to man, is wonderfully portrayed by St. Augustine who explains it as essentially an ontological deficiency, a lack of being [*Confessions*, IV, 10 and 11]. The things of the world escape the spirit, “which wants to stand and dwell with the things it loves, and is overwhelmed and torn by the motion of fleeting things, to which it attaches itself with the bond of love.” It is torn because things flee from it and it would like to hold them fast but can find no place to do so: *in*

illis enim non est ubi, quia non sunt [“In them there is no place to hold, because they are not”]. In fact one cannot say of changing things, at any moment of their existence, that they really are, because they are always on the edge of being, in transit towards being, never adequately confirmed in being, always *in fieri* and never *in facto esse* [“In a state of becoming” rather than “in a state of being”]. Thus on the one hand the soul has a fundamental intuition of being and strives for the total reality, while on the other it seems obliged to desire fleetingness, that is, the total devolution of reality into becoming, and an endless succession of changing moments. In fact, however, the soul does not want this *successive infinity* of fleeting things but a simultaneous infinity of a single moment, that is, a moment containing past and future moments in a single whole. And this aggregation and unification is the definition of eternity: *interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio* [Boethius’s *Consolation of Philosophy*, Book V, Prose 6. “The full, simultaneous and perfect possession of boundless life”].

The words of Goethe’s Doctor Faustus to the fleeting moment are relevant here: *Verweil doch! du bist so schön!* [“Stay then, thou art so fair!”]. The words express the contradictory desire that the moment (a word derived from *movere*, to move) should stand still, that the fleeting not fly, the finite be infinite, the partial be the whole. If life is pure becoming and the religious presupposition that, as St. Augustine says, *anima esse vult et requiescere amat in eis quae amat* [Op. cit. “The soul wishes to be, and it loves to rest in the things it loves”] is false, then the only reality will be in change and only the complete occurrence of all changes (if that were available) would give

the whole of reality. But if, on the other hand, the whole reality is not a becoming but a whole and changeless being, then becoming is only the mode in which creatures participate in that fullness of being and gain access to it.

—*Romano Amerio*